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In this paper we will examine a question which is 
of central importance to a thorough understanding of 
Plato's Republic. Specifically, we will be asking 
about the role of compulsion in education as it is 
described in the Republic. At the outset this question 
must of necessity remain a bit ambiguous since its cen-
tral role in a dialogue which is ostensibly about 
justice is not at first apparent, nor are the precise 
meanings of the terms "compulsion" and "education." 
During the course of the paper, however, this will be 
brought into much sharper focus as I argue from the 
position that, on its most fundamental level, the 
Republic is concerned in a more significant way with 
education (paideia) than with justice. 
As for the idea of compulsion itself, we need to 
begin with a preliminary appreciation of just how 
thoroughly it permeates the Republic. Let us consider 
some of the senses this word can have. 
Most obviously, one can speak of physical com-
pulsion whereby the strong compels the weak. This can 
occur either on the level of one man compelling a 
weaker man to do his bidding, or on the level of a 
state compelling a man to act in a certain way, as for 
example when a state enslaves someone. In each case 
physical force is used to intimidate the weak for the 
benefit of the strong. The reader will of course re-
cognize this sort of compulsion as underlying Thrasyma-
chus' definitions of justice in Book I. Another sim-
ilar sort of compulsion which is also pervasive in the 
Republic is in fact at issue in the opening scene of 
the dialogue. There, it will be recalled, Socrates and 
Glaucon are detained by Polemarchus' slave boy and are 
compelled by threat of physical force to remain the 
Piraeus. A third form of compulsion, the most perva-
sive form in the Republic, is the compulsion which a 
good argument exerts on those who hear it, or the com-
pulsion exerted by dialectic truth. 
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All three of the above forms of compulsion can be 
found in the Republic, and oftentimes they occur in 
combination. Thus, as we proceed to examine the spe-
cific role of compulsion in education, the actual sense 
of compulsion which is intended will have to be 
developed gradually as we proceed. Before turning to 
these matters, however, it will be necessary to say 
something about the importance of the discussions of 
education which occur in the Republic. 
What, then, is education as described in the 
Republic? Following Sallis2 we can ask about education 
from at least three important and interconnected 
perspectives: we can ask about education with respect 
to the Republic's roythos, with respect to its ergon, or 
with respect to its logos. Let us now try to under-
stand the nature of this threefold framework from 
within which we will address the problem of education. 
It has been convincingly argued by Bloom3 that the 
central issue posed by the Republic is the relationship 
between the philosopher and the city. If we accept 
this, then we might understand the task of the Republic 
as undertaking to educate young men in such a way as to 
overcome the apparent paradox which underlies the rela-
tionship between philosophers and the cities they live 
in. Or we may push still further in understanding this 
task. As we will try to show in what follows, should 
this paradox prove insurmountable, which is to say 
should the political life be seen as somehow inadequate 
or ineffectual, we can come to see the task of the 
Republic as a defense of philosophy and at the same 
time as an education in philosophy. Furthermore, this 
task of education can be seen in terms of the logos—we 
can examine the various discussions about how to edu-
cate the guardians, or later the philosopher-king--but 
it can also be seen in terms of ergon—we can look at 
the effect Socrates' discussions and arguments have on 
his various interlocutors. In the first case we are 
operating from within the narrower framework of the 
nature of specific arguments, while in the second case 
we are attempting to grasp the dramatic context of 
those arguments. As Sallis points out, this is the 
distinction between what is said in the dialogue and 
the context in which it is said.4 Because of its 
character as a dialogue, in reading the Republic we 
will need to be concerned with education in speeches 
(logos) as well as education in deed (ergon). 
By way of a brief digression we wiTT now attempt to 
make this distinction between logos and ergon more con-
crete, to ground it in the dialogue itself. In Book 
II, Socrates poses the question that will determine the 
direction of the dialogue for the better part of three 
books: "But how, exactly, will they |the guardians) be 
reared and educated by us?" (376c). Then follows the 
tale within a tale on the level of logos of how these 
men are educated. 
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Let us consider first of all the speech itself in 
which the education of the guardians is first deter-
mined in its most general form (376d-377a). In this 
speech between Socrates and Adeimantus the education of 
the guardians is seen to consist of two main parts: 
(1) education in music (which includes speeches), and 
(2) education in gymnastic. The former is said to 
develop the soul, the latter the body. But there is 
also an interesting division within the education in 
music: (A) education in tales which, though false, 
have true things in them, and (B) exercises, or true 
speeches. Thus in chronological order, the education 
of the guardians proceeds in the following three 
stages: (1) False logoi which nonetheless contain some 
truth (poetry); (2) Gymnastic; and (3) True logoi 
(philosophy). This progression, which is worked out in 
great detail in Books II-IV, is the tale of education. 
But it is also necessary to consider this tale as a 
tale within a tale: that is, to consider these 
speeches we have just refered to as a tale within the 
larger tale that is the Republic as a whole. To do 
this entails a consideration of what Sallis calls "dra-
matic character.1,5 
The drama of the Republic, in general terms, is 
quite simple: it is the education of the young men 
with whom Socrates is conversing. Once we undertake to 
lay out the specifics of this education, however, its 
complexity increases. The education of the guardians 
is described in a tale which occurs near the beginning 
of a larger tale (the Republic). With this in mind, 
let us consider a remark of Socrates': "'Don't you 
understand,' I said, 'that first we tell tales to 
children? And surely they are, as a whole, false, 
though there are true things in them too. We make use 
of tales with children before exercises' (377a)." The 
tale of the education of the guardians, then, may be 
thought of as on the whole false, although containing 
some truths. It occurs near the beginning of the di-
alogue, and thus we can say that Socrates is making use 
of it at the beginning of the education of Adeimantus 
and Glaucon which will occupy him for the rest of the 
Republic. Socrates, then, should be seen as fashioning 
this tale with great care so that it will properly 
shape the plastic souls of his listeners and prepare 
them (the ergon of the tale) for the subsequent true 
speeches. Furthermore, the young men who are Socrates' 
interlocutors—especially Glaucon and Adeimantus—can 
be seen as children, at least with respect to philoso-
phy which will ultimately turn out to be the proper end 
of their education. 
Let us summarize the above discussion. It will be 
recalled that this discussion was offered as a digres-
sion to enable us to see in play a distinction between 
two significant elements of the dialogue. The distinc-
tion we were seeking to ground is that between logos 
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and ergon. But the above discussion has another role: 
through it we can see how the subject of education is 
first explicitly broached in the Rebublic. That is to 
say, we have seen how education in this initial discus-
sion arose as a tale within a tale, the former of which 
is on the whole false. However, in this paper we will 
want to concentrate on the true speeches about educa-
tion which occur in Book VII. To understand those true 
speeches from the standpoint of their dramatic context, 
it was necessary to point out some of the character-
istics of the origins of education in tales such as the 
above. This dramatic context of the true speeches 
about education permeates the whole of the Republic to 
the extent that we see the central task (ergon) of the 
dialogue being to educate the participants. 
Having set the stage, then, in terms of dramatic 
context and the logos/ergon distinction, let us again 
take up our central question, but now with respect to 
the true speeches: What is education as described in 
t n e Republic? We will turn now to the true speeches of 
Book VI I, which will be our concern for the rest of 
this discussion. 
Perhaps the most succinct definition of education, 
or the art of teaching, is to be found near the middle 
of the cave image in Book VII. There Socrates says to 
Glaucon: 
But the present argument... indicates that this 
power is in the soul of each, and that the in-
strument with which each learns...must be turned 
around from that which is coming into being 
together with the whole soill until it is"able to 
endure looking at that which is...(518c). 
Teaching, then, is the art of this turning-around, and 
the turning itself is enacted as the process of 
education. This definition, of course, is cast in the 
terms of the cave image. It is intended to evoke the 
image of the cave dweller being freed from his bonds, 
turning around to face the bright light behind him, and 
being dragged forth from the cave into the sunlight. 
In short, it is a turning from darkness to light, or 
from the visible to the invisible in the terms of the 
divided line (517a). 
With this definition in mind, let us turn now to 
the central issue in this investigation and consider 
the role of compulsion in education. As will be seen, 
this theme emerges most clearly through a contrasting 
of the cave image with the subsequent description of 
the education of the philosopher-king. These two 
discussions have many points in common with respect to 
the issue of education, although for our purposes it 
will be necessary to look especially at the significant 
points of difference between them. These differences 
will have to be explained before we can be in a posi-
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tion to appreciate the full subtlety of Socrates' 
discussions of education and the role of those discus-
sions in the drama of the Republic as a whole. 
One can see many instances of compulsion in the 
cave image. For example, right from the start the cave 
dweller is portrayed as a prisoner, indicating the 
sense in which a man is imprisoned in and by his city, 
being shackled by the beliefs and customs of that 
city.6 But it goes much deeper than this initial 
phase. The prisoner is then released, compelled to 
stand up, compelled to walk around and look towards the 
light, and it is indicated that he does not want this 
done to him and that he will fight it (cf. 517a; cf. 
also the discussion of spiritedness as the defense of 
the familiar and hostility to the unfamiliar, 375b-e). 
The teacher, then, has to compel the cave dweller to 
look at the light, and then has to drag him along the 
steep upward way out of the cave and into the light 
(515e-516a). And once the prisoner adjusts to the 
light and sees this new sphere as representing the hap-
piest life, he is again compelled, this time to return 
to the cave and rule over the other prisoners. 
Socrates says that his concern is not with the happi-
ness of any one class, but rather with the happiness of 
the whole, and this happiness is achieved through per-
suasion of compulsion, through making each class snare 
its benefits with the others (519e-520a). The key, 
after all, to the Beautiful City is to have it ruled by 
those who are least eager to rule—the philosophers. 
So they are persuaded/compelled to rule by the city 
which nurtured them in the first place. The fact that 
the possibility of the Beautiful City hinges on the 
philosopher ruling should indicate to us how central 
the problem of his education is to the dialogue as a 
whole.7 And, in fact, having presented the drama of 
this education in the image of the cave, Socrates next 
turns his attention to a consideration of what studies 
have the power to effect the turning-around, which in 
turn sets the whole process of the philosopher's 
coming-into-being in motion. It is in the considera-
tion of these studies that we notice an interesting 
difference in tone from the image of the cave, and it 
is in terms of this difference that the central issue 
of our investigation is framed. 
Let us review several aspects of the stages of 
study which Socrates and Glaucon lay out as together 
having the power to turn the soul around towards what 
is. The underlying task behind this discussion, it 
will be recalled, is to see how philosophers come into 
being and how they are to be led up to the light of 
what is, or to episteme (knowledge, the highest segment 
of the Divided Line). The first level of education 
deals with the art of number and calculation (522c-
526c). What is at issue here, and in the next four 
levels as well, is a phenomenon which will demonstrate 
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the inadequacy of an explanation based on sensation and 
which, as a result, will "summon thought" to provide a 
more adequate one. The art of calculation and number 
leads to thought only in a case in which a thing could 
be either of a pair of opposites, as is illustrated by 
Socrates' "three-finger example." If our knowledge of 
number and calculation can enable us to determine that 
the finger which is both bigger and smaller is in fact 
two things, each of which is one, then we will be 
satisfied with the report of sensation. But these are 
not the instances which Socrates is interested in. He 
argues that thought would only be provoked by the in-
determinate instance in which the thing is in fact one 
thing with two possible explanations. Such a phenome-
non then leads the soul upwards and compels it to 
discuss numbers themselves (525d), rather than dealing 
with numbers associated with tangible bodies. As 
Socrates says, "it's likely that this study is really 
compulsory for us since it looks as if it compels the 
soul to use the intellect itself on the truth itself" 
(526b). Why? Because any explanation that remains in 
the sensuous realm would prove inadequate. 
We can see the significance of this compulsion to 
move beyond the merely visible, which is of central im-
portance for our arguments here, if we digress a moment 
and ask just what is involved in it. Let us consider 
this moving-beyond in terms of the schema of the 
Divided Line where we can see that what is at issue 
here is what Sallis refers to as the transition across 
the major division-point of the Divided Line, which 
also signifies the beginning of philosophy.8 If we 
look at Sallis' analysis of the two kinds of dianoia 
(thinking) and the provocation which leads to the 
upwardly-moving dianoia, the movement which allows us 
to break out of our rest in the visible, then we can 
better understand the inadequacy of resting in the 
visible. It is in turn this inadequacy which is cru-
cial to the beginning of philosophy, and thus to the 
ergon of the central books of the Republic which seek 
to engage Glancon in just such a beginning.a The role 
of dianoia, when confronted with the sort of perceptual 
inadequacy we were just referring to, is to separate 
out the indeterminate mixture (the finger as big and 
small), to reveal the relational aspect of it, and to 
pose the distinctness of this relation over against the 
indeterminacy of the visible.10 Mathematics, then (and 
number and calculation represent only the first of five 
levels of mathematics to be considered by Socrates), 
represents an attempt to "regard the visible order in 
terms of the intelligible (e.g., mathematical) order 
that has been posed; it becomes possible, in other 
words, to impose a determinateness on the visible order-
in such a way as to provide a clarification of it. . . 
n i l 
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The most important distinction for our purposes 
which Sallis makes is between upward-moving and 
downward-moving dianoia; the latter is the attempt to 
regard the visible in terms of the intelligible but as 
such it remains turned toward the visible; the former 
is the turning-away from the visible which charac-
terizes philosophy, and the turn towards the Good. 1 2 
We can readily see how this schema fits Socrates' 
discussion of number and calculation. The aspect of 
number and calculation which is turned towards the vis-
ible is that aspect of it which is necessary to the 
warrior, who must have some knowledge of philosophy, but 
who still remains rooted in the visible (522e). The 
concern that Socrates and Glaucon express at the outset 
of their discussion of education in Book VII, namely 
that the study must not be useless to warlike men 
(52Id), is a concern with precisely this downward-
moving dimension of dianoia. The upward-moving aspect 
of number and calculation is then distinguished from 
the downward to the extent that it raises the philoso-
pher out of becoming and turns him upwards, towards be-
ing (525b). 
As Socrates continues with his discussion of the 
various studies which the philosopher-king is to 
undertake, more emphasis is placed on this turning tow-
ard being: this, after all, is the important turning-
atound of the prisoner in the cave, which in turn 
spawned the entire discussion we are considering. 
Sallis points out that this increasing concern with the 
upward-moving dianoia is also the development of the 
ultimate separation of the philosopher from the ruler, 
which at least initially is not seen as a separation.'3 
The development of this separation is the development 
of the inadequacy of simply resting in the visible, a 
matter which we mentioned above and to which we will 
return shortly. 
Having described the art of number and calculation 
as the first level of the education of the philosopher-
king, Socrates continues to discuss the subsequent 
levels of Plane Geometry, Solid Geometry, Astronomy and 
Harmonics. Each of these studies is described as 
resulting in an increasing provocation to turn away 
from the visible and toward the intelligible in much 
the same way (although more explicitly with each suc-
cessive stage) as we have seen to be the case with num-
ber and calculation. Then Socrates makes the crucial 
transition to the final level of studies, dialectic. 
He refers to the first five levels of education as 
preludes to the song itself, which is dialectic (531d-
532b). Thus there is an important sense in which these 
first five levels are preparatory to Philosophy. As 
Sallis shows, the first five levels of education lead 
progressively upward, away from the visible. Their 
culmination, dialectic, is then an exercise in 
episteme.'4 As a result, the man engaged in dialectic 
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"comes to the very end of the intelligible realm" 
(532b). 
Let us turn now to the song itself, to dialectic 
(531e-534d). Dialectic is the art of giving an account 
and receiving one (531e). The dialectical man tries by 
means of argument to attain to what is. He grasps by 
intellection that which is good itself, and in so doing 
he comes to the very end of the intelligible realm 
(532ab). The entire prelude (the first five levels of 
study) has the power of release (releasing the prisoner 
in the cave from his bonds), and leads the soul up to 
the contemplation of what is brightest, what is best in 
what is. 
Dialectic, though, is different from all other 
things to be learned. It is inseparable from the 
learning process that would teach about dialectic, and 
thus Socrates cannot present Glaucon with an image of 
it (533a). The arts of the prelude result in a dream-
ing about what is, but they cannot see it in full wake-
fulness as long as they rely on hypotheses about their 
beginnings. Dialectic differs from them because it de-
stroys such hypotheses and proceeds to the beginning 
itself (533bd). Dialectic draws the eye of the soul 
gently out of the bog of the visible and turns it 
around, using the arts mentioned as helpers (533d). 
Let us consider in more detail the sense in which 
dialectic is different from the first five levels. 
This difference is most easily seen in terms of the 
destruction of hypotheses. From the image of the 
Divided Line in Book VI we recall that such destruc-
tion, together with a proceeding to beginnings, is pre-
cisely what marks off the highest segment of the line— 
episteme (510b). This is a significant transition 
because it marks a decisive break with what has come to 
be called Socrates' Hypothetical Method as described in 
the Meng and especially the Phaedo. With this transi-
tion to dialectic, a certain EinU of self-sufficiency 
is achieved.1 r' Both in the Phaedo and in the Republic, 
Socrates associates this move to self-sufficiency with 
a significant change in the direction in which an in-
quiry proceeds. In the Phaedo, the method of hypothe-
sis Socrates describes moves from a state of affairs to 
be described to an hypothesis which can account for its 
cause, to a still higher hypothesis if necessary, until 
agreement is reached. As thus described, this is a 
process which moves toward an end, namely agreement as 
to the cause of the state of affairs in question.16 
However, as Bluck notes, it is essential to recognize 
that this sequence of hypotheses is not a process of 
reasoning from one proposition to another. The various 
hypotheses are not simply logical propositions in our 
modern sense of the term, but are rather a series of 
provisional explanations of the cause of what is being 
discussed.17 
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The transition to dialectic which Socrates des-
cribes in the Republic entails something quite dif-
ferent from what is discussed in the Phaedo. What is 
at issue for dialectic is to turn the agreement charac-
teristic of the Method of Hypothesis into knowledge 
(533c). Dialectic too begins with hypotheses, but in-
stead of moving towards still higher hypotheses which 
would serve to produce agreement as the end or telos of 
the process, it destroys them and moves in the opposite 
direction toward the beginning, toward the forms 
(533cd), and ultimately toward an unhypothetical first 
principle (the Good) which had been the unrecognized 
basis for the method of Hypothesis all along (511ac). 1 8 
How are we to understand this change of direction 
which seems to be characteristic of the transition to 
dialectic? Here it will be helpful to recall the 
discussion of a similar transition in the image of the 
Divided Line, and to think of this transition in those 
terms, namely as a transition from the third to the 
fourth segments of the line. As we have already seen, 
the third segment of the line is characterized by two 
different senses of dianoia, one of which remains 
dependent to some degree on the visible and one of 
which leads to episteme or philosophy (see pp. 7-8 
above, and the discussion of upward-moving and 
downward-moving dianoia). The two ways in which 
hypotheses can be used, as described in the image of 
the Divided Line, have a relationship to each other 
which parallels the relationship between the two kinds 
of dianoia. What has been referred to above as the 
"Method of Hypothesis" or the "Hypothetical Method" re-
fers to one way of using hypotheses, namely the way 
characteristic of mathematics. As Socrates points out, 
this method, as employed by geometers, has a certain 
dependency on visible forms even though it is concerned 
with intelligibles (510d). This is in fact a descrip-
tion of the way in which dianoia can turn toward the 
visible, which as we noted Sallis calls "downward-
moving dianoia." 
The second way in which hypotheses can be used en-
tails the movement toward beginnings rather than toward 
ends, and it ultimately involves the destruction of 
those hypotheses, as we have already seen. We referred 
to this upward tendency earlier as "upward-moving 
dianoia." As Robinson clearly points out, the diff-
erence between these two uses of hypothesis is most ob-
vious in terms of a claim to certainty. The Method of 
Hypothesis as described in the Phaedo, as well as the 
description of the first use of "Hypothesis discussed 
above, makes no claim to certainty, while the second way is aimed at grasping beginnings or the unhypotheti-
cal first principle, and in so doing make a claim to 
certainty.19 This difference vis-a-vis the claim to 
certainty in turn leads to all sorts of logical prob-lems unless we understand the destruction of hypotheses 
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properly. The destruction of hypotheses, then, is 
required for the transition from end to beginning, from 
agreement to knowledge, from the Method of Hypothesis 
to the Method of Dialectic or Philosophy, from dianoia 
to episteme. 
In light of the above discussion, it is important 
to note that the destruction of hypotheses does not it-
self constitute dialectic, just as upward-moving 
dianoia was not itself episteme. Bather, this destruc-
tion Functions to lead the questioner to the point at 
which dialectic or philosophy begins, namely the point 
at which the questioner grasps the Good as the begin-
ning. Dialectic is only possible when the argument 
grasps the Good as its beginning and comes to see that 
argument depends on this beginning (511bc). We can now 
see why it is not insignificant that in describing the 
Method of Hypothesis in the Phaedo Socrates and his in-
terlocutors took the existence of"the forms for granted 
(lOObc). The Method of Hypothesis is unable to give 
any sort of account of the forms other than to take 
them for granted. A true account of the forms can only 
occur on the level of dialectic, and it is for this 
reason that with dialectic the pinnacle of the educa-
tional process is reached. 
Another sense of the uniqueness of dialectic can be 
seen in Socrates' remark that he cannot provide an 
image of it. In response to Glaucon's request that 
they move on from a discussion of the "prelude" (the 
first five stages of study) to a consideration of "the 
song itself" (dialectic), and that they go through it 
"just as we went through the prelude," Socrates 
responds: 
You will no longer be able to follow, my dear 
Glaucon,... although there wouldn't be any lack 
of eagerness on my part. But you would no longer 
be seeing an image of what we are saying, but 
rather the truth itself, at least as it looks to 
me (532d-533a). 
Nicholas White, for one, seems simply to pass over this 
crucial passage. White says of Plato in this passage 
that ". . .he explicitly excuses himself from pursuing 
the topic of dialectic further than he has, on grounds 
of an inability to settle the pertinent questions, and 
there is no reason not to take him at his word." 2 0 
However, even a casual reading of the above passage 
reveals that White is not taking Plato at his word, for 
nowhere does Socrates excuse himself from going fur-
ther, either explicitly or implicitly. Rather, this 
passage is crucial for the development of the rest of 
the Republic for at "least two reasons which White does 
not mention. 
First of all, it is important to see that what 
Socrates does say is that he will not be able to go on 
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and consider dialectic in the same way as the earlier 
studies. Because of its peculiar nature, dialectic 
cannot simply be described in an analytic way as the 
earlier levels of study were. What we have here, at 
the very instant when Socrates begins to consider di-
alectic, is a failure of the conventional logos, the 
conventional form of argument. This failure occurs at 
precisely the point of transition from "an image of 
what we are saying" to "the truth itself," and as such 
its significance cannot be overestimated. Dialectic is 
a realm which in an important way does not have to do 
with images: the dialectical man has successfully 
turned away from the flickering images in the cave. 
The peculiar thing is that one cannot learn about di-
alectic except insofar as one can engage in it. Thus 
to the extent that Socrates can reveal dialectic to 
Glaucon, he has to do so by drawing Glaucon in, by get-
ting Glaucon to partake of dialectic and thus drawing 
him into philosophy. It will be recalled that in terms 
of the ergon of the Republic this drawing of Glaucon 
into the fold of philosophy is the central task for 
Socrates to accomplish. 
This last point brings us to the second significant 
aspect of the passage cited above. What I have 
referred to above as the breakdown of conventional 
logos at the point of transition to something new, 
namely dialectical logos, also serves to situate the 
education in deed (ergon) of Glaucon and Adeimantus 
with respect to the speeches about education in which 
they have been engaged. This failure of the conven-
tional logos at precisely the point of transition to an 
account öf dialectic which would have to be at the same 
time a doing of dialectic serves as a strong indication 
that Glaucon (and implicitly his brother Adeimantus as 
well) is really too young for dialectical activity. He 
will be unable to follow Socrates because his own edu-
cation has not properly prepared him for such a major 
transition. Glaucon has not had the education in deed 
(ergon) which Socrates, Adeimantus and he have worked 
out in speech (logos). 1 will return to this matter 
near the end of this paper, although it is important to 
note here that the coming-into-being of the philosopher 
seems to have been accomplished only in speech and not 
yet in deed. The reader will also recall what was said 
above concerning the Phaedo and the need to take the 
existence of the forms for granted. There as here 
Socrates brings his interlocutors to the threshold of 
philosophy, but they are unable to cross. It seems to 
be the function of most if not all the Platonic dialo-
gues to bring the interlocutors and the reader to the 
threshold of philosophy and to stop there, leaving it 
up to the individual in each case to cross or not. 
This view is confirmed by Hiram Caton in a quite diff-
erent context, but it is perfectly in keeping with what 
Socrates does say about the nature of dialectic.2' 1 
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will have more to say about this in my conclusions, but 
this failure of Glaucon to be able to follow Socrates 
into the realm of philosophy (and as we will see 
shortly, it would be quite inappropriate for Socrates 
to compel Glaucon to follow, by virtue of the nature of 
dialectic itself) indicates that Glaucon is not 
properly prepared, and perhaps he could never be 
properly prepared except by the educational process 
which they have described for the Beautiful City. 
As a result of the importance we have now seen to 
be accorded to dialectic, it is easy to understand why 
in the whole of the educational process special atten-
tion must be paid to establishing the proper basis for 
it. We haye also seen that it is only through the 
mastery of dialectic that one can make the transition 
to the highest segment of the Divided Line and become a 
philosopher. Thus everything—the possibility of the 
city and the education of Glaucon and Adeimantus— 
depends on proper education. Proper education, in 
In the above considerations of the true speeches 
about education, we have been able to see how education 
culminates in the coming-into-being of the philosopher. 
In considering these speeches we have also made passing 
reference to compulsion, but never in a context which 
would let its significance emerge. The proper context 
in which to understand how compulsion fits into the 
education of the philosopher-king is in the discussion 
of the distribution of studies. This we will briefly 
summarize before turning again to our central question. 
There are in effect seven stages in the educational 
process. In the first stage, only worthy men are 
selected to take up philosophy (535a-536d), which is 
done with respect to all parts of virtue. Furthermore, 
unlike the situation of the guardians in Book III 
(413c-4l4b), we must not wait until men are old to make 
the selection because of the preparatory education they 
must have as children. The second stage of the educa-
tional process concerns the beginning of this prepara-
tory education. The free man should not learn slav-
ishly, so play rather than force is used in training 
the children. (At this point we can see an interesting 
aspect of the ergon of the Republic: recall (536bc) 
that the whole dialogue is play—thus Glaucon and 
Adeimantus are the children being playfully educated in 
deed. This characterization of the dialogue as play 
also gives further support to my reading of its inabil-
ity to draw Glaucon across the threshold and into 
philosophy. (Cf. end of section I above). We will 
have more to say on this shortly, but briefly this 
stage entails education in various studies (presumably 
terms of both lo 
central issue ol" 
can thus be seen as the 
II 
3?. 2 
the first five levels of study mentioned above) as 
play. 
The third stage of education is compulsory gym-
nastic, which was discussed at some length In the 
earlier books of the Republic. It is a training of the 
body, and is of two or three years duration. 
The fourth stage is synoptic education, which is in 
effect a systematic overview of the childhood education 
of the second stage. In terms of our systematic 
discussion of the studies above, the synoptic stage, 
which is given to 20-year-olds, would gradually bring 
out the distinction between the visible and the intel-
ligible and would be such as to show the role of each 
of those studies in that overall upward progression. 
This stage lasts 8-10 years. 
The fifth stage involves testing men with the power 
of dialectic, and it occurs only when they are over 30 
years old. This test is to show who is able to make 
the transition from sense to what is, and it requires 
much care. Men must not be exposed to arguments when 
they are too young, for they would tend to treat them 
as play and misuse them, falling then into disbelief 
(539b). Thus while play was appropriate to earlier 
stages of education this is no longer the case. 
The sixth stage is the return to the cave. The 
student is compelled to rule in the affairs of war and 
all other suitable offices for 15 years. Then comes 
the seventh and final stage. At age 50, the survivors 
are led to the end and compelled to look toward the 
light. They are then compelled to use the Good itself 
as a pattern for ordering the city, private men and 
themselves. This these men do for the rest of their 
lives. For the most part they are occupied with phi-
losophy, although each must take his turn in politics 
and ruling. In this way they educate other likeminded 
young men to follow them. 
Ill 
To this point we have considered in some detail the 
sense in which education is a central issue in the en-
tire development of the Republic, we have undertaken to 
lay out the true speeches about education as given in 
the cave image and in the discussion of the studies of 
the philosopher-king, and finally we have tried to show 
the structure of the entire educational process. In 
light of all this, we are now in a position to make 
some remarks about how compulsion enters into the edu-
cation of the philosopher. In terms of the above 
discussion, we can ask: Is compulsion an important and 
necessary part of the education of the philosopher, as 
the image of the cave might suggest, or is it detrimen-
tal to that education which might be better guided by 
persuasion and even a certain degree of playfulness as 
the discussions in the rest of Book VII might suggest? 
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Or we can ask the same question again in terms of 
Sallis' analysis of the Divided Line: Is compulsion 
necessary for the "dianoetic shift" that results in the 
commencement of the upward-moving dianoia and the 
beginning of philosophy, and if so what is the nature 
of such compulsion? 
It should be clear from all of the above analyses 
that these different questions are in effect asking the 
same question, which is perhaps the central question in 
the whole Republic. In terms of the logos of the 
Republic, we have tried to show how this question is 
intimately connected with the possibility of a philoso-
pher-king ever coming into existence, and it is readily 
apparent from the "third wave" of Book V (473a-e) that 
the very possibility of the Beautiful City depends on 
precisely such a genesis. It is to bring about this 
genesis in logos that Socrates ventures to develop the 
Sun-Good Analogy, the Image of the Cave, the Divided 
Line and the discussions of education in Book VII. Of 
course at the same time Socrates is equally involved 
(perhaps more involved given the ultimate implausibil-
lty of ever solving the paradox of the philosopher-
king) with bringing about this genesis in ergon, or in 
deed. That is to say, it is Socrates' concern to edu-
cate at least Glaucon from among his interlocutors, and 
in so doing to bring him in deed to the beginning of 
philosophy. This effort, it~would seem, comes to its 
culmination in the discussion of the sixth level of 
education, dialectics, at which point Socrates says 
that he can no longer offer images but only the truth 
itself (533a). The only way to progress beyond this 
obstacle is to engage in dialectic itself, for dialec-
tic is unique among all the levels of education in that 
it does not lend itself to being talked about: such 
talk is dialectic. And finally, in terms of the mythos 
of the Republic, or the ascent from Hades, it is only 
with the genesis of the philosopher that the ascent can 
begin anew. That ascent was interrupted in Book 1 by 
Polemarchus as Socrates and Glaucon were attempting to 
ascend from the underworld—from the Piraeus. It was 
then prevented from resuming at the outset of Book II 
and again at the outset of Book V. But now with the 
genesis of the philosopher-king, the ascent can at last 
resume. The ascent from the underworld is the ascent 
to philosophy, and in considering how the philosopher 
comes into being the ascent is resumed (521c). 
The role which compulsion actually plays in this 
ascent (the ascent in all three of its dimensions) is 
curious, for it points to a limitation in such an 
ascent; indeed it points to a limitation in the whole 
of the Republic, namely the neglect of the bodily or 
erotic side of man. 2 2 This is most easily seen in the 
image of the cave. The cave itself with all of its 
prisoners represents a city, and the prisoners are its 
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citizens. The shackles of the prisoners are the 
customs and beliefs of the city. 
Compulsion, then, enters into the cave first of all 
in breaking the shackles of the prisoners. Why is this 
such a task? We can recall from Book II the nature of 
the spiritedness of the guardians; to be gentle to what 
is familiar and hostile to what is unknown (375d-376c). 
Thus compulsion is necessary here to combat and over-
come the resistance of the spirited part of the 
prisoner's nature. It is necessary for him to be free 
if he is going to engage in the questioning of beliefs 
which is characteristic of the philosopher. Thus the 
resistance which the prisoner puts up, and which neces-
sitates his being dragged out of the cave and into the 
light is all the result of his spiritedness: as Book 
II pointed out, this is a very strong element in man's 
nature, the more so if it has been encouraged by gym-
nastic training. Compulsion in this sense is necessary 
until the prisoner's eyes become accustomed to the 
light and he becomes happy with his new-found situa-
tion. When this occurs, compulsion in this first sense 
is no longer necessary—the spiritedness has been 
overcome, and indeed it has been re-molded to resist 
any attempts to leave this new world. 
But leave it must, and here compulsion in a second 
sense emerges: the compulsion to return to the cave. 
This sense is similar to the first in that it involves 
an overcoming of spiritedness, but there is an added 
dimension of necessity. It is a compulsion from 
without, to abandon the new-found world, but it is 
equally a compulsion from within, from within the cave 
which the prisoner can never totally leave, and from 
within the prisoner's very nature. This added neces-
sity is brought about by the necessary incompleteness 
of the philosopher's ascension: his upward way was 
only an ascension of the soul, and during the entire 
time it was underway (the entire time he was up in the 
light) his body remained a prisoner in the cave/city. 
Thus he is compleiled to return by the fact that one 
can never detach oneself from one's body, from the 
erotic dimension of one's nature. So in this second 
sense of compulsion the prisoner is compelled to 
return, he is compelled to rule, in short he is 
compelled to re-unite with his body. 
This second sense of compulsion with the character-
istic incompleteness mentioned above provides us with 
an excellent opportunity to see the central importance 
which the cave allegory has for the Republic as a 
whole. To fully understand the significance of educa-
tion for Plato and to grasp the importance which educa-
tion has for the Socratic/Platonic conception of the 
political, it is necessary that we see why the body 
stays in the cave and can never leave. We need, then, 
to briefly explore the allegorical nature of the cave 
image. 
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Let us consider the image of the cave as an alle-
gorical representation of the human condition. In do-
ing this, we can immediately recognize a parallel 
between the fundamental relationship described in the 
cave (the relationship of imprisonment within the cave-
community) and Socrates' discussions of the nature of 
man in the Republic as well as in other dialogues. 
Most obviously, the condition of the prisoner within 
the cave mirrors Socrates' description of the soul as 
imprisoned within the body, as "nailed" or "chained" to 
the body (cf. Phaedo, 66cd and especially 62b). 
Secondly, the prisoner within the cave can be seen to 
mirror the relationship which a citizen has to the laws 
of his state, as I have already suggested above. Thus 
we have a curious threefold parallelism here: 
Prisoner : Cave :: Soul : Body :: Citizen : Country 
At this point it should be clear how significant 
the sense of incompleteness is which I referred to 
above, and thus why the prisoner is compelled to return 
to the cave. As Socrates has clearly argued elsewhere, 
the soul cannot simply leave the body whenever it 
wishes, but must wait for a proper sign (Phaedo, 62c). 
Nor can the citizen simply leave behind the laws of his 
state, as is clearly evidenced by the situation of the 
historical Socrates and the drama surrounding his ac-
ceptance of his sentence as presented in the Crito 
(50e-51c). Thus we can see that the necessity which 
compels the prisoner to go back into the cave has the 
profoundest metaphysical significance for Plato to the 
extent that it mirrors the compulsion which unites soul 
to body and citizen to the laws of his state. The 
metaphysical sense of incompleteness rests in the fact 
that such a premature break of the prisoner from his 
cave (of the soul from the body; of a man from the laws 
of his state) goes against the essence of the human 
condition as Socrates sees it. Furthermore, just as 
there is a proper time for the soul to finally break 
from the body according to nature, likewise there is a 
proper time for the prisoner to leave the cave com-
pletely, but this happens only when he dies. The ini-
tial exit we were speaking of above, then, is more 
along the lines of the beginning of the act of philo-
sophical purification or weaning of the soul from the 
body which Socrates describes in the Phaedo. The com-
pulsion to return is then of the same'sort which Jeads 
Socrates to argue against suicide (63e-67b). 
The final act of compulsion mentioned in the cave 
occurs when at age 50 the survivors of the first ascent 
are led back out of the cave (not compelled this time, 
but "led": they seem to need help Tor their eyes are 
used to the dark, but they do not seem to have to be 
forced to walk up). Once outside, however, they are 
compelled to look toward the light and to use the Good 
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as a pattern for ordering themselves and the city. 
This would seem to be the compelling of an old man to 
realize fully his potential at last. As an old man the 
body is no longer a factor (recall Socrates' discus-
sions with Cephalus early in Book I, 328e-329d). Thus 
the prisoner can leave the cave (bodily desires) behind 
for the most part, although he cannot completely detach 
himself to the extent that he still must rule from time 
to time. The goal of this third sense of compulsion 
seems to be a completion. Only now, after the first 
ascent, the return to the cave, and then a second 
ascent, is the prisoner in a position to use the Good 
itself as a model, and only now is this required of 
him. It is only after this compulsion has been suc-
cessfully undertaken that the old men are in a position 
to become teachers. They then take their turn at rul-
ing when necessary, but most importantly they educate 
like-minded young men to follow them (540b). Thus they 
become in a way the source of the first sense of com-
pulsion, namely the breaking of the chains and the 
dragging-up. This act can be seen as the most erotic 
of all acts—the act of procreation: it is only at 
this point that these old men can bring about the gene-
sis of their successors, can bring about the "birth" of 
a new generation of philosophers. 
We have, then, these three senses of compulsion in 
play during the education of the philosopher-king, 
according to the scenario set forth in the cave image 
and the discussion of the distribution of studies. We 
have seen how the compulsion in each case is necessi-
tated by the nature and circumstances of the prisoner— 
each sense of complusion is in a way a response to the 
incompleteness of the prisoner's nature. Thus it would 
seem that each sense of compulsion is necessary for the 
education of the philosopher-king. How, then, are we 
to understand Socrates' requirement in 536de that 
"instruction must not be given the aspect of a com-
pulsion to learn" or that "the free man ought not to 
learn any study slavishly?" He says in the same pas-
sage "don't use force in training the children in the 
studies, but rather play." The key to unraveling this 
requirement would seem to rest in coming to understand 
the precise sense of "compulsion" or "slavishness" 
which Socrates wants to prohibit. 
The prohibition we have just pointed out occurs at 
a significant place in the distribution of studies. It 
occurs with reference to the second of the seven stages 
mentioned above, the stage of preparatory education. 
It is at this stage that play is used: play provides 
the framework for the very first exposure a child has 
to education. As we know from the earlier discussions 
of the education of the guardians (which, while on the 
whole false, nonetheless do contain some true things), 
this insistence on play cultivates the imitative power 
that children have. Likewise any sort of effective 
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compulsion that one might assert in opposition to 
playfulness in this sense would be either physical 
force or the threat thereof, both of which Socrates 
seems to have dispensed with as inappropriate. Thus in 
contrast to such merely physical compulsion the founda-
tion of the philosopher's education rests on playful 
imitation. 
But why, one might ask, was this imitative element 
not present in the cave? This question introduces an 
important distinction into our considerations. What we 
are confronted with in effect is the distinction 
between what the cave in fact illustrates and what the 
discussion of the distribution of studies refers to. 
In the latter case, Socrates is concerned with educa-
ting the philosopher-king from scratch. This fact is 
illustrated by the requirement he makes at the end of 
that discussion to send all members of the city older 
than ten years out of the city. Thus the distribution 
of studies begins with young children. 
In contrast to this, there are no children in the 
cave. The cave is apparently a city of adults who are 
unaware of their circumstances. The image of the cave 
itself would seem to represent to a large degree the 
historical situation that Socrates finds himself in. 
It seems to present us with an established but decadent 
regime in need of reform (Athens), and to show us how 
to enact such a reform. If this is true, then such a 
reform would obviously not start from scratch. 
This contrast helps us to understand the prohibi-
tion of force that Socrates makes. The prohibition 
refers to the ideal situation in which the philosopher-
king has control over the rearing of children. In such 
a situation, care can be taken with how they are 
reared, and the proper amount of time can be allotted 
to each stage. But this only refers to the best of 
situations, and such conditions are unlikely (which in 
turn makes the Beautiful City unlikely). The improba-
bility of these conditions is perhaps most clearly ex-
pressed in the requirement that all those over ten must 
be sent out into the country and yet still must: support 
those left behind. So if we are not likely to ever 
have the best of conditions to work with, we are in-
stead put in a position of having to do the best with 
what we have: we must attempt to reform the city we 
axe in. This situation is indeed reflected in the er-
gon of the Republic: according to the distribution ol 
studies, men are not to be tested with the power of di-
alectic until after age 30. But what is the Republic 
if not such a testing of the interlocutors, especially 
Glaucon and Adeimantus, in the power of dialectic? And 
it would be unlikely that any of the interlocutors, 
with the exception of Cephalus and probably Thrasyma-
chus, are over 30. What this seems to say is that, 
lacking the best situation, one does the best one can 
with what one has. There is also the possibility, as 
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evidenced by Claucon's inability to follow Socrates in 
dialectical logos, that in this case the results might 
have to be less than desired. 
If, then, the prohibition of force in education has 
the significance we have just pointed out, we can see 
that it is only in effect at an early stage of 
education. In fact, beginning with the fifth stage, 
the testing with the power of dialectic, the tendency 
toward a certain type of playfulness must be de-
emphasized totally, and undertaking that would presuma-
bly have started in the previous stage of synoptic 
education. Play as imitation is useful in providing a 
foundation for philosophy, but it is quite inappropri-
ate to the practice of philosophy. This is further at-
tested to by the fact that the highest segment of the 
Divided Line—episteine—explicitly excludes all images 
or imitations of that sort. So to counteract any chil-
dish playfulness that might creep in at this advanced 
level, a certain compulsion would seem to be required. 
Here, however, rather than mere physical force, what 
seems to be involved is something like the intellectual 
compulsion of good argument. This seems to be the 
sense of compulsion which drives upward-moving dianoia 
to the level of episteme. 
We might be confused at this point by the charac-
terization of the limited scope of usefulness we have 
assigned to play given Socrates1 remark that the whole 
dialogue is play (536bc). What this tells us, though, 
is only that play is appropriate to the biginnings of 
philosophy.23 Glaucon and Adeimantus are beginners, 
and the whole task of the Republic from the perspective 
of ergon is to bring them to undertake a proper 
beginning. We have seen that play is quite appropriate 
to this task, and only becomes inappropriate if we ven-
ture playfully beyond such beginnings, into the realm 
of philosophy or dialectics itself where playfulness is 
considered a misuse of dialectic (539bc). Perhaps this 
is why, in describing dialectic with Glaucon, Socrates 
does not attempt to venture into that realm explicitly 
(533a). The dialogue must still remain playful, for 
Socrates' interlocutors are not yet properly prepared 
for a transition of such magnitude. 
Compulsion, then, remains necessary to the develop-
ment of the philosopher, especially in the second and 
third examples developed above where it comes to take 
on the form of compelling argument. Compulsion is cru-
cial to the philosopher's development because it brings 
him to completion. In bringing the philosopher to com-
pletion, we have in a sense realized the highest point 
in the Republic. 
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